CRIMINAL LAW-

EVIDENCE -EXPERT
TESTIMONY RELATING TO
SUBJECT MATTER OF BATTERED WOMEN ADMISSIBLE ON ISSUE

OF SELF-DEFENSE-Ibn-Tamas v. United States,

407 A.2d 626

(D.C. 1979).
On February 23, 1976, Beverly Ibn-Tamas was charged with the
fatal shooting of her husband, Dr. Yusuf Ibn-Tamas, 1 which had occurred that same morning after a violent argument. 2 It was uncon-

troverted that on the day of the shooting, notwithstanding Mrs. IbnTamas' pregnant condition and protestation, her husband struck her
and ordered her out of their home. 3 At dispute, however, was the
severity of the beatings which preceded the fatal shots, 4 as well as the
extent to which the deceased had committed similar acts of violence
upon his wife. 5 The defendant testified that she fired the fatal shot
in the belief that her husband was armed to kill her, 6 although he
had no gun at that time. 7 A central issue at trial, therefore, was the
reasonableness of Mrs. Ibn-Tamas' belief that her life was in immi8
nent danger.
1 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 628 (D.C. 1979). Beverly and Yusuf IbnTamas had been married for approximately three and one-half years. Id.
2 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 630 (D.C. 1979). The dispute and subsequent
shooting took place at their family home where Dr. Ibn-Tamas retained an adjoining office. Id.
3 Id. at 630 & n.9. Appellant further testified that she was dragged upstairs to the bedroom, threatened with a .38 caliber revolver and told, "'You are going out of here this morning
one way or the other.' " The doctor then returned to his office. Id. at 630.
4 Brief for Appellant at 2, Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant]. Appellant claimed that not long after her husband went
downstairs to his office, he returned into the main part of the house to resume his attack. He
pushed her against the bureau upon which he had left the gun. Fearful that he was going to
grab it, she picked up the gun and fired a shot to scare him. He then left the room. As she
started towards the stairway, he allegedly lunged at her. At that point, Mrs. Ibn-Tamas fired
two shots, one of which proved to be fatal. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 630-31
(D.C. 1979).
The doctor's nurse testified, however, that she heard the first shot about three seconds
after she had seen the doctor go back into the house. The shot sounded as though it was coming
from the landing. She then heard a thud and the second shot. Id. at 631.
' Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 3. Appellant testified that on a previous occasion her
husband had accused a friend of her's of being a lesbian and ordered her from their home.
When Mrs. Ibn-Tamas protested his rudeness, he struck her with various objects including his
fists. Weeks later, he threatened her with a loaded gun. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d
626, 629 (D.C. 1979). The only testimony which contradicted this violent behavior was that of
the deceased's mother. Id. at 629 n.2.
6 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 631 (D.C. 1979). Brief for Appellant, supra
note 4, at 2-3.
7 Brief for Appellant, supra note 4, at 3.
' Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979). Brief for Appellant, supra
note 4, at 3. The deceased's actions had placed her in such a state of fear that she testified, " 'I
just knew he was going to kill me.' '" Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C.
1979).

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11:255

Beverly Ibn-Tamas was found guilty of second-degree murder 9
on July 29, 1977, and from this verdict appealed. 10 She contended
that the trial judge had erroneously excluded expert testimony related
to the subject matter of battered women proffered in support of her
claim of self-defense."
The trial court excluded this testimony for
the following reasons: 1) "it would 'go ... beyond those [prior violent] acts which a jury is entitled to hear;' " 2) "it would 'invade ...
the province of the jury;' " and 3) " '[the expert], of necessity, conclude[d] that the decedent was a batterer. "12
In Ibn-Tainas v. United States, 13 the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia held, for the first time, that expert testimony
relating to "battered women" was admissible on the grounds that it
would not invade the province of the jury14 and that its probative
value was not outweighed by its prejudicial impact. 15 The court,
however, did not reverse the conviction because the trial record was
insufficidnt to establish as a matter of law that all of the criteria for
admissibility had been satisfied.' 6 Accordingly, the case was remanded to the trial court for a determination of all of the relevant

criteria. 17

In reviewing the trial court's ruling on the profferred expert testimony, the court of appeals in Ibn-Tamas utilized a bi-level
analysis.' 8 The threshold analysis involved the question of admissibility to which the three-fold test previously enunciated by the court
in Dyas v. United States was applied. 19 The Dyas test, governing
the admissibility of expert testimony, requires that:
(1) the subject matter "must be so distinctively related to some

science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken
9 The case was first tried in September 1976, but after the jury returned a verdict of
guilty, the trial judge declared a mistrial. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 628 (D.C.
1979). He believed that the appellant's right to effective counsel had been prejudiced, and that
the jury's use of a dictionary created an additional prejudice. Id. at 628 n.1. Upon her conviction in 1977, Beverly Ibn-Tamas was sentenced for a period of one to five years. Id. at 628.
50 Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 628 (D.C. 1979).
11 Appellant raised a total of six issues on appeal. As to all but the error excluding expert
testimony, the court of appeals affirmed. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 628 (D.C.

1979).
12 Id.

at 631.

13 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
14 Id. at 639.
15 Id. Contrary to the majority's holding, the dissent concluded that the proffered testimony

was "irrelevant to any material issue in the case." Id. at 653 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).
16

Id. at 640.

17

Id.

18 Id. at 632.

19 376 A.2d 827, 832 (D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); 407 A.2d at 632.
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of the average laymen [emphasis added]"; (2) "the witness must
have sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth [emphasis added]"; and (3)
expert testimony is inadmissible if "the state of the pertinent art of
scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be
0
asserted even by an expert." 2
Judge Ferren, speaking for the majority in Ibn-Tanas, considered
the second ground proposed by the trial court for excluding expert
testimony to be the sole ground going to admissibility. That proposal
was based on a possible invasion into what was held to be "the province of the jury." 21 Accordingly, the court proceeded to analyze that
22
ground by applying the first prong of the Dyas test.
Whether the subject matter is " 'beyond the ken of the average
layman,' "23 requires that the testimony provide insight into the evidence which the unaided jury could not otherwise perceive. 2 4 To
satisfy this criterion in the situation at hand, the expert must shed
light on relevant aspects of the defendant's relationship with her
husband which a jury would not gain simply by evaluating the defendant's self-defense testimony. 25 Pursuant to a review of the trial record, the majority declared that this criterion was indeed met.
20 376 A.2d at 832 (quoting C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13,

at 29-31 (2d ed. 1972)).
21 407 A.2d at 632. The court noted two ways in which the expert could preempt the jury's
function. First, the expert could state a conclusion as to an ultimate issue. Id. See, e.g., United
States v. Spaulding, 293 U.S. 498, 506 (1935) (expert's opinion furnished no basis for opposing
inferences); Lampkins v. United States, 401 A.2d 966, 971 (D.C. 1979) (opinions which would
merely tell jury what result to reach as to guilt or innocence, or'which submit the whole case to
expert for decision, should be excluded).
Second, the expert could "speak to matters which 'the jury itself is just as competent to
consider' " and weigh. 407 A.2d at 632 (quoting Lampkins v. United States, 401 A.2d 966, 969
(D.C. 1979)). See also, Waggeman v. Forstmann, 217 A.2d 310, 311 (D.C. 1966) (need for
expert testimony disappears where his function no longer aids trier of fact); C. MCCOMIICK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13, at 29-30 (2d ed. 1972).

The court disposed of the first pre-emptive means by concluding that the expert would
have merely supplied background data in aid of the jury's ultimate conclusion on the question of
self-defense. 407 A.2d at 632. The court noted that, in recent years, the ultimate facts rule has
been relaxed, particularly where the expert states an opinion on facts which the jury can not
draw. Id. at 632 n.13. See, e.g., Casabarian v. District of Columbia, 134 A.2d 488, 491 (D.C.
1957) ("The real test is not that the expert opinion testimony would go to the very issue to be
decided by the trier of fact, but whether the special knowledge or experience of the expert
would aid the court or jury in determining the questions in issue.").
22 407 A.2d at 633. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
23 407 A.2d at 633.

Id.
Id. The expert testified, out of the jury's presence, that battered women typically possess.
little self-esteem, feel powerless, and have few close friends. They often feel responsible for
24

25
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Specifically, the court of appeals considered Mrs. Ibn-Tamas' testimony on direct examination, that on the morning of the shooting,
her husband repeatedly beat her, ordered her to leave the house, and
threatened her with a pistol. 26 The defendant further testified that,
mindful of her husband's propensity to commit brutal and violent acts
upon her, 2 7 she perceived herself to be in imminent danger at the
time of the shooting. 28 On cross-examination the government attempted to discredit this testimony by suggesting that the defendant's
account of her marital relationship was exaggerated, 2 9 and, in any
event, a woman truly fearful of her husband would have either left
30
him or at least sought help from friends or the police.
To rebut this line of attack, the defense proffered the testimony
of its expert, Dr. Walker, in order to inform the jury of the battered
woman phenomenon. This testimony would have demonstrated that a
battered woman's behavior is at variance with the average lay per3
son's notion of how one would react to a spouse who is a batterer.
Agreeing with this position, the appellate court reasoned that the testimony would have served two relevant functions.3 2 First, it would
have enhanced the defendant's credibility in responding to questions
about her marital relationship;3 3 and, second, it would have supported her belief that she was in imminent danger on the morning of
the shooting, thus reinforcing Mrs. Ibn-Tamas' contention that she
had acted in self-defense. 3 4 More importantly, the expert would
have supplied an interpretation of the facts relating to the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the shooting which was beyond the ordinary lay perception. 3 5 In so doing, the court of appeals held that the
their husband's behavior. However, they also believe that their husbands are capable of killing
them and that there is no escape. Id. at 634.
26 Id. at 630. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
27 407 A.2d at 634. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
28 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
29 407 A.2d at 633-34. The government further suggested that because of her exaggerated
account, Mrs. Ibn-Tanias' belief that she was in imminent danger at the time of the shooting
was "implausible." Id. at 633.
30 Id. at 634.
" Id. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. Dr. Walker would have told the jury that
of the 110 battered women she had studied, 60% had never told anyone that their husbands beat them, "40% had told a friend, and only 10% had called the police." 407 A.2d at 634.
When asked about her interview with the accused, Dr. Walker replied that Mrs. Ibn-Tamas was
'a classic case' of the battered wife." Id.
32 407 A.2d at 634.
33 Id. The expert testimony would have countered the government's questions designed to
show that the accused's testimony about her marital relationship was "implausible." Id. at 633.
34 Id. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
35 407 A.2d at 634-35. The expert's testimony would have been akin to that admitted in the
case of Patricia Hearst " 'to explain the effects [of] kidnapping, prolonged incarceration, and
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first Dyas criterion had been met as a matter of law. 3 6 Notwithstanding the erroneous ruling by the trial court as to this criterion, the
appellate court was constrained to determine whether the trial judge
had implicitly addressed the second and third criteria required for the
37
ruling.
The court analyzed the second Dyas criterion, whether the expert has sufficient skill in the field,3 8 pursuant to the standard established by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Jenkins
v. United States.3 9 As in lbn-Tamas, Jenkins involved the admissibility of testimony by a psychologist. 40 According to Jenkins, the test of
the psychologist's competence to testify as to the diagnostic category
into which the accused's condition would fit depends upon the "nature and extent of his knowledge." 4 1 Jenkins also stressed that the
actual experience of the witness, and not his or her medical
background, was the critical factor with respect to the competence of
42
the witness to testify as an expert.
The trial record in Ibn-Tamas established that Dr. Walker was
permitted to testify as an expert in a similar case involving a battered
woman accused of killing her spouse. 43 Dr. Walker's qualifications
included, but were not limited to, a doctorate in psychology, a private practice, clinical experience and research in relation to wife batpsychological and physical abuse ... on the defendant's mental state at the time of the [criminal act].' " Id. at 634 (quoting United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 889, 890 (N.D. Cal.
1976)).
36 407 A.2d at 635.

37 Id. "[11n scrutinizing the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion, the reviewing court
may examine the record and infer the reasoning upon which the trial court made its determination.' " Id. (quoting from Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 366 (D.C. 1979)).
Of interest to note, however, is that the court of appeals' evaluation of the record was
clearly from the vantage point of an affirmance of the erroneous discretionary ruling. See 407
A.2d at 635-36. Apparently, the court concluded that to draw inferences from the record in
order to satisfy the second and third Dyas criteria as a matter of law would usurp the trial
court's discretion. While Johnson suggests this defferential view of trial court discretion,
Johnson also suggests an important trade-off: "Ifthe error in the discretionary determination
jeopardized the fairness of the proceeding as a whole, or the error had a possibly substantial'
impact upon the outcome, the case should be reversed." Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d
354, 366 (D.C. 1979). Thus, because of the tri-part nature of the ruling on admissibility involved herein, and the failure of the trial court to expressly rule upon all the essential criteria,
the benefits of reversal which otherwise accrue where the error in discretion is material, are
compromised in favor of trial court discretion. See 407 A.2d at 639 (the excluded expert testimony was highly probative and central to the claim of self-defense).
38 407 A.2d at 636-37. See note 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
39 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 645.
42 Id.at 644. Prior to Jenkins, psychologists were not qualified as experts to render diagnostic opinions because they lacked medical background. See Note, Psychologist's Diagnosis Regarding Mental Disease or Defect Admissible on Issue of Insanity, 8 VILL. L. REv. 119 (1962).
43 407 A.2d at 636 n.18.
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tering, and affiliation with various psychological associations. 4 4 At
the time of trial she was also under contract to publish the studies
she had done on wife battering a5
Despite her abundant knowledge and experience in the field, the
court was unable to resolve the question of Dr. Walker's qualifications as a matter of law. 46 Although the court conceded that, based
on the Jenkins test, Dr. Walker could not be disqualified as a matter
of law, 4 7 it could not determine from the record whether the trial
court had ruled thereon. 4 Accordingly, this issue was remanded to
the trial court for determination. 4 9
Finally, the court analyzed the facts of Ibn-Tawas in light of the
third Dyas criterion which asks whether "the state of the pertinent
art or scientific knowledge is sufficient to permit an expert opinion., 50 Satisfaction of this criterion requires that the witness'
method of scientific inquiry has gained general acceptance in the particular field of expertise. 5 ' The court expressly rejected the government's contention that Frye v. United States 52 should render Dr.
Walker's methodology unacceptable. 5 3 The court noted that Frye
dealt only with the admissibility of expert testimony based upon new
methods of scientific inquiry which had not gained general acceptance
in the field of expertise. 54 In addition, the court distinguished IbnTarnas from those decisions which have precluded reliance on expert
testimony because the state of scientific knowledge was so meager. 55
"[S]uch instances merely reflect the court's conclusion that no reliable methodology for making the inquiry has been discovered." 56

44

Id.

45 Id.
46 Id. at 640. The court did note, however, that no one had questioned Dr. Walker's qualifications. Id. at 637.
47 Id. at 637.

48 Id. at 636 n.17.
49 Id. at 640 n.28.

50 Id. at 637. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
51 407 A.2d at 638.
52 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1910).
53 407 A.2d at 637. The court noted that since the relevant expert diagnosis is not limited to
a medical diagnosis, the field of expertise is broad enough to include clinical psychology. Id. See
Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962). In addition, the question was not, as
the government contended, whether there was a common acceptance of the subject matter
studied. 407 A.2d at 637.
54 407 A.2d at 638. For example, this criterion is directed to the use of the "polygraph,
spectrographic identification, psycholinguistics, [and] tests for marijuana." Id. & nn. 21 & 22.
55 Id. at 638. Where the cause of the disease is unknown, such as cancer, expert testimony
is unreliable. Id.
56 Id.
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Thus, the relevant inquiry became whether Dr. Walker's use of
in-depth interviews for studying and identifying 110 battered women
had gained general acceptance in the field of clinical psychology. 5 7
While the court recognized that trial courts are encouraged to ignore
the third prong of Dyas, " 'relegating any disagreement in the scientific community to the weight, not admissibility of the testimony,' "58
it could only concede that Dr. Walker's methodology did not fall
short as a matter of law. 59 Again, because the court of appeals was
unable to conclude that the record manifested a trial ruling thereon,
60
this issue was remanded.
In light of the fact that admissibility remained an open question,
the court focused upon the second level of its bi-level analysis which
concerned the probative value versus the prejudicial impact of Dr.
Walker's testimony. 6 1 The first and third grounds provided by the
lower court in excluding the proffered testimony related to its prejudicial effects. 62 With regard to the first ground, the court of appeals
stated that in the case of homicide, "prior acts of violence are admissible . . .'where the defendant raises the claim of self-defense against
the decedent as the alleged first aggressor.' "63 Noting that at trial
substantial testimony relating to the decedent's earlier attacks had
been admitted, 64 the appellate court viewed the incremental prejudicial impact of labelling the victim as a batterer as minimal. 6 5 Having
already concluded that the expert's testimony would have provided
the jury with relevant insight into the central issue of self-defense, 66
the testimony on battered women was, therefore, highly probative, 6 7
clearly outweighing any prejudicial impact as a matter of law. 68
The decision of the court of appeals in Ibn-Tamas marks the first
significant step toward judicial recognition of the behavioral
57 Id. Her studies were of battered women from all racial and socio-economic groups. Id. at
634. See notes 85-88 infra and accompanying text.
5' Id. at 638 n.23 (quoting MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 203 (2d ed.
1972)).
59 407 A.2d at 639.
60 Id. at 639 n.25. Contrary to the majority, the dissent concluded that the
trial court had
properly addressed the third test in excluding the testimony. Id. at 648 n.7 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).

Id. at 639.
Id. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
63 407 A.2d at 639 (quoting from United States v. Akers, 374 A.2d 874, 877 (D.C. 1977))
61
61

(emphasis omitted).
64

407 A.2d at 639.

65 Id.
66 Id. at 634. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
67
68

Id. at 639.
Id.
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phenomenon known as the battered women's syndrome. By concluding as a matter of law that the battered woman phenomenon is
beyond the ken of the average layman (first Dyas criterion), 6 9 the
substantive hurdle for the purpose of admitting expert testimony related thereto is overcome. 70 Thus, the impact of Ibn-Tamas is not
only recognition of the phenomenon, but is also an expansion of the
subject matter about which experts may testify. However, because
the court was unable to conclude that the other two Dyas criteria
71
were sufficiently met in order to warrant reversal of the conviction,
the precedential value of the decision is substantially undercut.
Furthermore, the guidance which it provides future litigants on the
ultimate question of admissibility of expert testimony concerning battered women is at best limited.
In light of the Jenkins standard, 72 and Dr. Walker's abundant
qualifications on the record, 73 it is difficult to reconcile the appellate
court's inability to qualify her as an expert witness. More problematic, however, is the court's failure to direct the trial court to allow
further evidence of Dr. Walker's credentials. This appears to suggest
that the record is sufficient to support, on remand, either qualification or disqualification. 74 In effect, this permits the trial judge to
exercise unfettered discretion in determining whether or not a
psychologist is qualified to testify as an expert and casts doubt on the
Jenkins standard. Further, trial judges may be encouraged to compile
ambiguous records in order to support ambiguous rulings. 75 Where,
for example, the record fails to reveal an express determination upon
all the necessary criteria required for the ruling, 76 the trial judge may
nevertheless, on remand, preserve in his silence the improprieties
which may prompt his erroneous determinations, sheltered by his
77
unchecked claim to superior opportunity to observe the witness.

69 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
70 See note 23 supra and accompanying text.

71 See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
72 See notes 39-42 supraand accompanying text.
73 See notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
74 407 A.2d at 640 n.28. "[I]n ruling that the expert testimony is neither inadmissible nor
admissible as a matter of law, we are not suggesting that we believe the record is so deficient
that the trial court must take additional testimony before exercising appropriate discretion." Id.
75 Id. at 640 n.29. The need for remand was "for clarification because the stated reasons
were erroneous and [it] could not be certain that the record otherwise supported the ruling as a
matter of law." Id.
76Id. at 635.
77 Id. at 636 n.17. Because the evidence on the record did not permit one interpretation,
the court suggested that the trial court might have excluded Dr. Walker's testimony on the
basis of its "opportunity to observe and appraise the witness." Id.
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Additionally, in view of the legal analysis established by the
court regarding the third prong of Dyas78 and its conclusion that
Frye was inapplicable, 79 the necessity to remand this issue is unclear.
Perhaps the majority's inability to approve of Dr. Walker's methodol80
ogy was prompted by the adamant disapproval of Judge Nebeker.
In his dissent, he characterized Dr. Walker's data base of 110 battered women as a "paltry universe." 81 Moreover, the dissenting
opinion indicated that because the record was "utterly devoid" of evidence concerning the method used or its general acceptance in the
field, the foundation for the testimony was "patently inadequate." 82
Once again, the decision to take further evidence on this issue was
left to the trial court's discretion, 8 3 appearing to suggest that the record was sufficient to support either acceptance or rejection of her
4
methodology. s
There is little question that, among her colleagues, Dr. Walker's
methodology is both traditionally accepted and frequently used.85 Indeed, the ability to compile data and detect behavioral patterns based
upon interviews and observations is a skill which behavioral scientists
are trained to master. 8 Yet it has taken the legal profession 'decades
to gain respect for the precision of behavioral science.8 7 Today, it is
the experienced advocate and judge who can appreciate the relevant
insight to be gained from this wealth of knowledge. 8 8
The court in lbti-Tainas has set significant precedent by recognizing the relevance of the behavioral scientists' studies. Nevertheless,
the remnants of skepticism, perhaps attributable to na'ivet6, which
still pervade the legal community, 8 9 are hidden within this legal
monument and inhibit its potential. Hopefully, with the benefit of
hindsight, future appellate courts will require trial judges to express
reasons on the record, 90 or to make further evidentiary findings on all
78 See notes 51-56 supra and accompanying text.
9 See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text.
80 407 A.2d at 639 n.25.
81

Id. at 655 (Nebeker, J., dissenting).

82

Id.

See notes 75-77 supra and accompanying text.
84 407 A.2d at 639 n.25.
85 Lassen, The Psychologist is an Expert in Assessing Mental Disease or Defect, 50 A.B.A. J.
8

239 (1964).
86 Rose, The Social Scientist is an Expert Witness, 40 MINN. L. REV. 205 (1956).
87 Id. at 216-17.
88 Id. at 217. See also Louisell, The Psychologist in Today's Legal World, 39 MINN. L. REv.
235 (1955).
89 See Louisell, supra note 88.
90 See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
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the necessary criteria 9 ' when faced with novel and material questions
relating to admissibility. 92 Such a requirement would minimize the
potential injustices93 occasioned by silence and ambiguity, reluctance
and naivet.
Ligerie Peterson Burns

91 See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
92 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
93 Id. See also Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 361-62 (D.C. 1979):
[I]f the trial court's decision is supported by improper reasons, reasons that are not
founded in the record, or reasons which contravene the policies meant to guide the
trial court's discretion or the purposes for which the determination was committed
to the trial court's direction, reversal is likely called for.
Id. at 367.

